

26
5
JPRS: 4442

10 March 1961

ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF INDONESIA

RETURN TO MAIN FILE

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

20000131 107

Photocopies of this report may be purchased from:

PHOTODUPLICATION SERVICE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
1636 CONNECTICUT AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FOREWORD

This publication was prepared under contract by the UNITED STATES JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE, a federal government organization established to service the translation and research needs of the various government departments.

JPRS: 4442

CSO: 1292-S

ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF INDONESIA

[Following are translations of articles on the above
subject, selected from Bintang Merah (Red Star), Vol XVI,
Djakarta, May-June 1960]

CONTENTS

PAGE

What does PKI Support for the 1945 Constitution and Guided Democracy Mean?	1
Raise High the Banners of Party Development in the Field of Ideology	21

WHAT DOES PKI SUPPORT FOR THE 1945 CONSTITUTION
AND GUIDED DEMOCRACY MEAN?

[Following is the translation of an article by Sakirman
in Bintang Merah (Red Star), Vol XVI, Jakarta, May-June
1960, pages 194-219]

On 23 May 1960 the PKI has existed 40 years and it should be appropriate for all of us Communists and progressive Indonesians to celebrate this historic day by learning sincerely and faithfully more of our past experiences, more even of the Marxist-Leninist theories, and by working and fighting more energetically in the interest of the masses.

This commemoration can of course assume several shapes and manners, among others, lectures, meetings and discussions and articles in the Central Party newspaper as well as in the regional papers, in magazines and especially in pamphlets.

In connection with this commemoration we can of course write about many problems, but I choose what I mentioned in the caption because I know of course that it is not easy to reflect effectively the political lines of the Party in former days, especially since it has decided to approve the return to the Constitution of 1945.

Especially because in our circles the bad habit of "subjectivism" is sometimes still evident, we often scrutinize a political era from one angle only or from a lopsided point of view which makes it difficult to reflect correctly the political lines of the Party. There are those among us who see only the shortcomings of the Party command and who do not see the results of the great and heroic struggle of the Indonesian people under the leadership of the Party; who see many defects in the formulations of the articles of the constitution and their execution, but do not want to see the good aspects of its practical application; they see the negative aspects of DPR-Gotong-rojong but do not see its positive aspects; on the other hand they want Parliament based on the theory of mutual assistance to see only the positive aspects of a Parliament based on general elections and not its negative aspects; they see only the failure of the August revolution and do not want to see its results, or, the reverse, they see only the results of the August revolution and do not want to see its shortcomings, etc.

An analysis of the political party lines since the return to the Constitution of 1945 and a further explanation of what Party support for the 1945 Constitution and guided democracy means must be insufficient if we do not first provide unbiased opinions of the experience with the 1945 Constitution during the years of the August revolution and with the 1950 Constitution. Because when we analyze first the real experiences with these two constitutions we can more easily understand the political strategy of the Party since we returned to the constitution of 1945.

As introduction it is necessary however, to explain with a few words the experiences of the great revolutions in Russia and in China. They are very useful sources of learning and very valuable for the struggle of the people of Indonesia for the completion of the unfinished August 1945 Revolution.

In his book "Two kinds of Social Democratic Strategy in the Democratic Revolution", Lenin explains clearly the problem relating the bourgeois democratic revolution and the socialist revolution. According to Lenin there is not only a close connection between the phases of the bourgeois democratic and the socialist revolutions, but they also influence each other and even determine each other: the first phase must lay the foundation for the second phase, and on the other hand, the second phase gives the first one its pattern and determines the direction in which it will develop. According to Lenin, the two phases not only possess the same characteristics, but also show differences. The bourgeois democratic and socialist revolutions are in so far similar that both must be led by the proletariat. This is an absolute requirement, something they cannot do without to guarantee a successful revolution. If the bourgeois democratic revolution does not take place under the leadership of the proletariat it will become stagnant during these capitalistic times. In this manner, its development will lose the correct direction towards socialism. When this direction is lost, it will sooner or later assume the character of a counterrevolution, which means that the revolution meets total obstruction.

The difference between the two phases of revolution is in the targets, in determining strategy, in the program, and in their tasks.

The basic target of the original democratic revolution in Russia was the feudal monarchic power of the czar and his entourage. To hit this target the Russian proletariat had to unite with the peasants while neutralizing the fearful and isolating the merchants.

The basic target of the Russian socialist revolution became the power of the Mensheviks who betrayed the revolution and cooperated with the imperialists. In order to destroy the Menshevik force thoroughly, the proletariat, which should have had formally as well as actually complete hegemony, united with the impoverished peasants and agricultural laborers to isolate fearful elements and to smash the remnants of the class of the merchants.

In connection with the problem of similarity and difference in character of the bourgeois democratic and the socialist revolutions we must point out that the "heroes" of the Second International or the right wing socialists who for reasons of principle had already deviated from the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist doctrine thought that the bourgeois democratic revolution ought to be led by the bourgeois class as a requirement for full development of capitalism. According to them, the socialist revolution could only be born after the peasants and the poor semi-proletarians of the whole world had been scorched by capitalism to become front fighters for the socialist revolution.

According to their reasoning, and there are quite a few representatives of this group in Indonesia, the socialist revolution can only be born after the whole world has developed into a capitalist monopoly and therefore after the so-called underdeveloped areas have been looted by the imperialists. It should be clear, however, that their idea of the leadership of the socialist revolution is purely a disguise to cover up their bad intentions to provide the imperialist nations with historic rights to subdue other nations still called underdeveloped.

The experience in the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the other socialist nations of Eastern Europe shows clearly that Lenin's theory on the problem of leadership of the bourgeois democratic revolution has been fully vindicated by the evidence. Between the two phases, therefore, of the bourgeois democratic and socialist revolutions is no wall that separates them completely, and the hegemony of the proletariat is a fundamental requirement to guarantee that the first phase will develop successfully into the second phase. Although it is clear that there is no wall separating the two phases, it does not mean that the two phases can be mixed; on the contrary, we must know the basic differences between the duties of the bourgeois democratic and the socialist revolutions.

We can make a comparison with people who want to construct a building of many stories. To succeed it is absolutely necessary that they lay a strong foundation able to support the upper stories. Only after the foundation is finished follows the construction of the first story. If we purposely or accidentally forget to make that foundation and we begin the construction of the upper part of that building whenever that suits us, this building will certainly collapse.

Laying the foundation for the bourgeois democratic revolution means completely overthrowing the power of imperialism, its landowners and catspaws, and at the same time liberating the productive energy of the people, especially the peasants, by giving them enough land in accordance with their needs.

We repudiate the idea that socialism will come by itself after the peasants of the whole world have been scorched by capitalism and also that socialism can be attained without a period of transition in the shape of the bourgeois democratic revolution.

Lenin's theory and strategy of the revolution and his theory on the relationship between the democratic and the socialist revolutions can be demonstrated clearly by the birth of the democratic revolution in February 1917 and the socialist revolution of October of that year.

There were, of course, several defects in the democratic revolution of February 1917, demonstrated by the fact that the proletariat did not have complete leadership of that revolution, because the formal power of the country after the fall of the czar was not in the hands of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) as its foremost fighter, but in the hands of the Mensheviks, represented by Kerensky and his followers.

This gave rise to what Lenin calls "double power" or power of the people and the proletariat as its essence and formal power of the Mensheviks, who were plotting with the imperialists.

According to Lenin, the cause of this double power was that during the last years of World War I numerous good and conscious elements of the proletariat and the poor peasants were forced by the monarchic government of the czar to carry arms in the foremost fronts of the imperialist war. This weakened the strength of the democratic revolution substantially.

But these defects were quickly overcome when the actual power of the workers and peasants developed in only a few months to gain the supremacy necessary to lead the great October Revolution. And the great October Revolution could indeed have developed peacefully if the Mensheviks had accepted Lenin's demand to avoid force. If the development of the democratic revolution of February 1917 into the great socialist revolution of October had depended only on the proletariat and the peasants under the great Lenin it would certainly have taken place in peace without force.

How is the experience in China? As predicted by Lenin, the Chinese people would soon have their 1905. Lenin certainly did not mean that the Chinese revolution was going to look like a duplication of the Russian revolution of 1905. Although the Chinese revolution has basic characteristics in common with the Russian revolution of 1905, it has also special and specifically Chinese characteristics.

In his pamphlet "Perspective of the Revolution in China" Stalin states in general terms that the Chinese revolution (before the liberation of 1949) had in the first place two specific characteristics, i. e.:

- (1) As bourgeois democratic revolution, the Chinese revolution is comparable to a revolution for national independence, all its force was directed against the power of foreign imperialism. This is the most important difference with the revolution of 1905 in Russia.

- (2) The national bourgeois element was very weak in China and especially so when compared to the bourgeois strength in Russia of 1905. The cause was the concentration of the basic industrial organizations in the hands of foreign imperialists. All this put the initiative and the leadership of the Chinese peasants in the hands of the Chinese proletariat by way of its party, the Chinese Communist Party.

Stalin's analysis is generally based on Lenin's view of the revolution in China, and comrade Mao Tse-tung has given this further depth and width, covering the details of the revolution as well as the relationship between the classes in China.

He says that the Chinese revolution which must be led by the proletariat can only be victorious when the proletariat succeeds via its party in uniting and mobilizing all revolutionary classes, the workers, peasants, petit bourgeois elements and national bourgeois elements in one united anti-imperialist national front, based on a firm understanding between workers and anti-feudal peasants. The higher Chinese bourgeois elements which Stalin pictures economically much weaker than those in

Russia of 1905, generally combined their forces with imperialists and feudalists and assumed the characteristics of the class of the compradors [Chinese contact men for Western enterprises].

The common strategy of the Chinese Communist Party during the bourgeois democratic revolution was to combine all revolutionary classes against all reactionary classes within the country that conspired with foreign imperialism. We know that this culminated in 1949 in the birth of the People's Republic of China.

From experience we know that there is a great difference between deciding upon a strategy and actually carrying it out. After the general lines have been decided upon, fundamental deviations that originate within the party itself can naturally be prevented. We mean deviations to the right because the party has excessively increased its bourgeois elements and deviations to the left because it has weakened too much the force of the national bourgeois element.

The experience in China shows that an effective execution of the general strategy of the Party during the bourgeois democratic revolution requires not only a thorough and objective knowledge of class relations in general, but also of special and concrete relations in order to face every political situation. Why can class relations change from situation to situation?

The reason is that with the exception of workers and peasants who show a stable character during a revolution, the other classes, the middle and the petit bourgeois class may change their nature. Under duress such may even be the case with the rich bourgeois class and the landowners who are the core of the stubborn groups in China. This case is different with the traitors, who remain stubborn and faithful to imperialism under all circumstances.

Regarding the petit bourgeois class, we quote the following conclusion: "the class of petit bourgeois people as a temporary social class has a dual nature: its right and revolutionary aspect learns that many of this class have an open mind as far as political influence, organization and even ideology of the proletariat is concerned, and they support the democratic revolution and can join its struggle. In the future they may follow the road to Socialism together with the proletariat; but its undesirable and backward aspect is not only its weakness which makes it different from the proletariat, but often when separated from the proletarian leadership it becomes a pawn of the liberal or even the rich bourgeois classes (Resolution of the Chinese Communist Party, BM [abbreviation unexplained], page 408).

On page 9 of his pamphlet: Methods of Resisting Japanese Imperialism", comrade Mao Tse-tung writes: "Petit bourgeois elements participated in the revolutions of 1924 to 1927. Just as with the peasants, their economic status is based on small results and cannot be reconciled with imperialism. Imperialism and the Chinese counterrevolutionaries have caused them much damage and many of them became unemployed, bankrupt or almost bankrupt. These people see now that they have become servants

of foreigners and they find no other escape except resistance". The words of comrade Mao and the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China show the difficulties in dealing with the character of the petit bourgeois class.

When the Party receives a heavy beating from the reactionaries, it may happen that the petit bourgeois class takes their side and becomes their prisoner; the opposite may occur when the revolution is started under effective and wise leadership, and this class unites faithfully and steadfastly with the proletariat.

The middle class of China shows a character that is different from that of the petit bourgeois class. Comrade Mao says in his pamphlet that the middle class is economically and politically very weak (in comparison with the rich bourgeois class, note of the author).

Because of their weakness the imperialists always oppress these people maliciously, and thus they drive them closer to the proletariat, the peasants and the small bourgeois class, but on the other hand, just because they are so weak, imperialists, landowners and compradors can easily tempt them to cooperate.

But in contrast to the petit bourgeois class, the middle classes are not steadfast and courageous in their support for the proletariat, and in their support of imperialism they display also an anxious and shaky attitude. They may change their alliance dependent upon the general political situation and the political strategy of the Party.

During the actual political struggle, it is obviously not so easy to determine if a political current in the shape of a civilian or a military organization represents the interests of the middle or the petit bourgeois classes. The middle classes are economically weak and often the fluctuations between them and the petit bourgeois class are important. Comrade Mao explains this in his pamphlet (page 12) the class structure of the 19th Route Army under the command of Tsai Ting-kai. This army represented the interests of the middle class, the upper layers of the petit bourgeois class, rich peasants, and small rural landowners. This conclusion was based on a class analysis of the command of the 19th Route Army and also on direct experiences of the Party itself. Tjai Ting-kai and his comrades in arms fought bloody battles with the Red Army, but later they agreed to fight the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek. In the province of Kiangsi they attacked the Red Army, in Shanghai they fought the Japanese, in Fukien they made peace with the Red Army and took up their arms to fight the Japanese. The knowledge of the Chinese Communist Party and its great leader Mao Tse-tung, of Chinese social, economic and political matters, of class relations in general and especially of class characteristics of political and military groups was a real blessing. The general strategy of the Party in fighting Japan and neutralizing the stubborn by uniting all revolutionary anti-Japanese groups and classes was warmly received by the people, as evidenced by the possibility of mobilizing them for the fight against the Japanese aggressor. The petit bourgeois class, with its negative and positive aspects, steadfastly

supported the policy of the Party, and in the Yen-an region which could be conquered completely by the Party it became the ally of the proletariat. A great many people of this class joined the organization and ideology of the Party. The middle classes, which during the years 1924 to 1927 supported the revolution and from 1927 to 1936 sided with the counter-revolution (page 12), showed its patriotic and democratic nature towards the Japanese aggressor, and, especially in the regions of Yen-an, they stood solidly behind the proletariat.

The economic weakness of the middle classes was the reason it did not present a solid and stable class, but one that could easily be broken up into three main currents; the left current representing the upper level of the small bourgeois class, the middle current representing the interests of merchants and tradesmen and the right current, connected in many ways with the imperialists, landowners and compradors.

Outside Yen-an, this middle class made up of three currents or wings and the small bourgeois class which was still under its influence were the core of the middle groups situated in between the progressive and reactionary factions of China which were fighting the Japanese.

Our question is now: will the stubborn groups that represent the interests of the big landowners and the compradors under Chiang Kai-shek remain solid and undivided under every circumstance?

Comrade Mao Tse-tung says on this subject: "within the stronghold of the big landowners and the compradors no complete unity is found. The reason is the semi-colonial status demonstrated by the presence of many imperialist nations snatching at China. When the struggle was aimed at Japanese imperialism, the imperialist Japanese dogs were fighting with English and American imperialist dogs. A politician of the Kuomintang, Hu Han-min, who in 1927 plotted with Chiang Kai-shek to exterminate Communism, was later captured by Chiang Kai-shek himself because he tried to grab Chiang's power. Hu Han-min, who remained reactionary because he relied on his influence among the very anti-Communist warlords of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, co-signed the document called "The Program of Four Articles to Resist Japan and Benefit the Country sponsored by the Party and also signed by Sung Ching-ling."

While Comrade Mao made his report on strategy to resist Japanese imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek sold out North China as a sequence to the sale of China's Eastern shore to the Japanese. Chiang Kai-shek's stubborn attitude of American agent who has changed completely to become a Japanese agent, began to change when he was captured by his own officers, who wanted to resist Japanese aggression in cooperation with the Chinese Communists. Under this pressure (December 1936) Chiang Kai-shek accepted the Communist invitation to stop the civil war and to resist Japanese imperialism with firm determination.

In 1940, when it became clear to everybody that Japan had the bad intention to change semi-colonial China into a complete colony, a new situation arose. It strengthened the united national anti-Japanese front under the leadership of the Party and fragmented the stubborn groups even more. The clique of Wang Ching-wei betrayed the Chinese people and

became Japanese henchmen. This treacherous clique of Wang Ching-wei received support from the big landowners and the pro-Japanese rich middle class.

There were also groups of big landowners and American and English agents, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, who split up in many fundamentally anti-Communist, but also anti-Japanese factions. One faction suggested taking measures to exterminate Communism first and to fight Japan later. Another faction, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, thought that it was as important to exterminate Communism, or "bandits" in their terminology, as to fight Japan, and a third faction was of the opposite opinion, i.e. fight Japan first and only when that was over exterminate the "bandits".

Here we meet several characteristics of the war against Japan led by the Chinese Communist Party. A part of the groups that had always been anti-Communist during the civil wars of 1924-1927 and during the agrarian revolution of 1927-1936 went over to the Japanese side, became the stubbornly anti-Communist pro-Japanese group.

Another part of the anti-Japanese alliance remained against Communism, but was within certain limits also against the Japanese. We may therefore draw the conclusion that during the war against Japan, the Chiang Kai-shek clique which pursued the Communists for almost ten years changed from its ever stubborn and reactionary attitude to become a two-faced stubborn group or temporarily a very right-wing group (read Comrade Mao's "On Politics" pages 8 and 9). The middle class and the upper level of the petit bourgeois class formed then the anti-Japanese and anti-Communist left wing of the middle groups.

But after the Japanese war was over and Chiang Kai-shek refused a proposal of the Party to form a coalition government of representatives of all classes and groups, anti-imperialists and anti-feudalists as well as the very right wing of the middle groups, his clique became the same stubborn group or "new" right wing group of a most reactionary nature.

While the Communist Party pursued its policy of a united front and while it applied the finishing touch to its relation with the middle groups and its core of middle class and petit bourgeois class, we must finally point out that its particular position could be broken down to three stages:

(a) being chased by Chiang Kai-shek's clique, which was far stronger than the progressive forces of that period (1924-1927 and 1927-1936).

(b) a situation wherein the Communist and progressive forces ruled in one part of China and cooperated in the other regions with the ruling Kuomintang.

(c) the Communist and progressive forces have assumed great power and are able to smash the reactionary power of Chiang Kai-shek (1946-1949).

It must now be clear that the Communist and progressive forces were not the ruling power in China while they pursued their policy of a

national front and applied the finishing touch to their relation with the middle classes by luring them within the united front against imperialism and feudalism.

What lessons do these glorious and heroic experiences of the Chinese Communist party contain for us?

First:

a. The basic difference between the people and the reactionary groups of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek developed for twelve years, from 1924 to 1936 and became antagonistic;

b. A superficial difference which existed from 1927 to 1936 between the progressive elements and the middle classes should not necessarily have developed into antagonism. Actually it became finally antagonistic through mistakes in the policy of the Party i.e., deviations to the right and to the left which claimed many victims.

c. During the war against Japan the fundamental difference between the people and the traitors of Wang Ching Wei and their stooges became irreconcilable; this was not the case with the basic difference between the people and the anti-Communist clique of Chiang Kai-shek who wanted to fight the Japanese.

d. The not so fundamental difference between the progressive people on one hand and the democratic anti-Fascist middle groups together with the middle class and the upper level of the petit bourgeois class on the other hand was reconciled peacefully during the war against Japan.

e. After the anti-fascist war, the difference between the people and the Chiang Kai-shek clique grew deeper and could not be settled peacefully on account of Chiang Kai-shek's stubborn attitude, and therefore became irreconcilable.

f. During the shift towards Socialism from 1949 to 1957, the minor differences among the people were settled along peaceful lines.

h. During the socialist reconstruction period, the differences between the workers, peasants and progressive intellectuals on one hand and the middle class on the other could be reconciled in peace, although they were fundamental.

Second:

a. There were two main reasons for political mistakes towards the left and/or the right.

(1) Wrong strategic views mixed up the stages of the national democratic revolution with those of the socialist revolution of pro-Trotsky elements, ultra leftists and other opportunistic elements in the leadership of the Party;

(2) Wrong tactical opinions because the relations between the classes in China were misunderstood as the doubtful and fickle minded nature of the economically and politically very weak middle class and the character of the petit bourgeois class with its negative and positive sides;

(3) Inability to grasp the meaning of the important moments of the revolution, to reverse every defeat and to make every victory a basis for consolidation and development.

Experience with the 1945 Constitution during the Revolution and with the Constitution of 1950

Stalin emphasizes, as we explained above, the importance of a basic feature of the Chinese revolution of 1905. It is the bourgeois democratic nature of the Chinese revolution, directed towards national independence whereby all forces were turned against foreign imperialism in China.

The August 1945 Revolution also has a national and democratic nature with intentions outlined by Sukarno during the session of the Committee for the Investigation of the Efforts to Prepare Independence during the Japanese Occupation. It is national because of its duty to fight imperialism and democratic on account of its duty to fight feudalism. These are the general features of the August 1945 Revolution that are similar to those of the national democratic revolution in China.

However, except for features similar to those of the Chinese revolution of 1927, the August Revolution also shows specifically Indonesian features. In 1927 revolution of China, led by the Chinese proletariat, exploded in a country that was not completely suppressed but already semi-colonial, while the August 1945 Revolution exploded while Indonesia was still a colony.

The mobilization of the forces of the August Revolution could consequently be conducted in a clearer fashion and more openly proclaimed as an anti-colonial war against armed aggression of the foreign Dutch colonialists, who through the centuries had become the traditional enemies of the Indonesian people and who were supported by the Allied forces, especially the English imperialists.

Second, the richer Indonesian middle class, mainly made up of the merchants of the colonial era, was very weak, much weaker than that of China, let alone of Russia. If the richer middle class was weak it can easily be understood that the middle class of Indonesia was even much weaker during the Dutch and Japanese colonial era. It is generally understood that the most advanced and radical political elements of the groups and classes outside the proletariat were indeed the representatives of the interests of the very weak middle class and the upper level of the petit bourgeois class.

Third, as result of the first and second features, the August 1945 revolution got a third feature that made it different from the 1927 revolution in China (and which it has in common with the Chinese revolution during the war against Japan of 1936-1945). It is that the August Revolution had from the start a well developed united national front that was able to attract Indonesians from all walks of life, political opinions, all religions and philosophies with the exception of some renegade traitors of country and people, imperialist lackeys, who felt more at ease while serving completely the interests of the Dutch colonialists.

Fourth, in the shining atmosphere of the revolution which had reached its summit and the unity of all the anti-colonial people of Indonesia, the 1945 Constitution was born. It was the realization of the basic law of

the freedom of people and country represented by the Republic of Indonesia with President Sukarno as first head of state and the reflection of the united national spirit and the spirit of resistance against the Dutch aggressor and his allies.

We just mentioned some positive features of the Revolution of August 1945, born as the result of a world situation that was very favorable for Indonesia when the fascist Japanese power was smashed in August 1945.

Except for these positive features, the August Revolution has negative ones that stand very much in the way of a genuine development and have very harmful results, such as:

(a) Lack of ideological and political consciousness of the Indonesian proletariat during the revolution. The reason was the impossibility of organizing Marxist-Leninist education for the proletariat during the Dutch and Japanese colonial era;

(b) The PKI's lack of experience, notwithstanding its venerable age, on two basic problems, i.e. (1) the problem of a united front and (2) the problem of the development of the Party. This made it impossible to establish the supremacy of the Party during the first stage of the revolution (D. N. Aidit: "Birth and Growth of the PKI");

(c) The weak economic and political status of the middle groups led by the middle class and the upper level of the petit bourgeois class; they were consequently unable to resist adequately the bad desires of the collaborators of the Dutch and English who wanted to grab power in the country;

(d) The influence of religion, especially Islam, for centuries widely accepted by the masses. Reactionary leaders could abuse it to attract the politically still backward people.

In the atmosphere created by the August Revolution with its above-mentioned positive and negative features, we notice that the formal leadership of the country as guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution moved out of the hands of president Sukarno into those of the reform group represented by the right wing socialist Sutan Sjahrir and the vice president of that moment, Hatta. Sutan Sjahrir succeeded in creating a general opinion, with his pamphlet "Our Struggle", that president Sukarno was considered a war criminal by the colonialist Dutch and their allies and that Indonesia's future fate should completely be in the hands of the imperialist Dutch, English and even Americans.

The Communists and progressives united in the FDR (Democratic Peoples Front) did not see the dangers of Sutan Sjahrir's ideas and steps that were obviously wrong. Sutan Sjahrir's intention was really to arrest the development of the August Revolution and to restore the economic power of the Dutch in Indonesia. It was of course not so easy to know right from the start of his first cabinet what Sutan Sjahrir's ultimate intentions were. But the Communists should have prevented and forestalled as much as possible the forced transfer of power from president Sukarno to Sjahrir and Hatta, because this was obviously in conflict with

the Constitution of 1945 which gives the executive power to the president as prime minister of the Republic of Indonesia. The Communists and progressives were then not only unable to resist Sjahrir's and vice president Hatta's measures that were clearly not in accordance with the Constitution of 1945, but the Communists were also unable to realize fully the nature of the economically and politically weak middle class and of that of the upper level of the petit bourgeois class with its many more positive and progressive aspects. They were therefore unable to see the change in their political opinion as compared to the political opinion of those classes under the fascist Japanese.

The evidence shows that not only these middle groups, called Japanese dogs by Sutan Sjahrir, participated in the revolution, but that also a part of the former Dutch and Japanese agents did at least not oppose, and even helped, the Revolution on certain occasions. A conspicuous political and legal transgression was the transfer of the executive power from the president to Sutan Sjahrir, since it conflicted with Article Four of the Constitution of 1945. Then began the development of a policy of decline which threw the Republic off its course set by the August Revolution.

This process of decline had actually started some time before Sutan Sjahrir came officially to power in the capacity of prime minister of the second cabinet of the Republic of Indonesia. It started when the KNIP was made a legislative council while it was only meant to be an advice council to the president with the BP KNIP [Badan Pekerdja Komite Nasional Pusat - Executive Committee of the Central National Committee] as its committee for daily affairs.

After the proclamation of the vice president's Announcement number Ten regarding the surrender of legislative power to the KNIP, which was signed by Mohamad Hatta on 17 October, followed Political Announcement of November 1945, also signed by Vice-President Mohamad Hatta.

From the standpoint of the struggle for democracy, this Announcement could indeed be considered democratic, because, no matter what, it gave the KNIP a democratic structure. But everybody who had more or less learned his political a b c's could smell that this Announcement number Ten was in the first place meant to pave the way for the Political Announcement of 1 November. This Announcement contains the ideas of the stubborn groups on completing the August Revolution by providing plenty of opportunity and legal guarantees regarding the return of the power of foreign capital owned by imperialism in general and by the Dutch especially. Announcement number Ten and Political Announcement of 1 November were in essence similar to the preparations of replacing the first cabinet, headed by president Sukarno himself, by the second cabinet of the Republic of Indonesia, headed by Sutan Sjahrir.

The first and most important political measures of Sjahrir's cabinet is famous as the Agreement of Linggardjati, and was also supported by the Communists and progressives who did not think of their historical duties. By joining the support for the Agreement of Linggardjati, the Indonesian Communists embarked upon a policy of isolation and compromise

that, intentionally or not, was to divide the strength of the Revolution. This is the mistake of overestimating the counterrevolutionary forces and underestimating the strength of the revolution. The Communists here deviated to the right.

Until right now a part of the Communists and progressives still think that the policy of Linggardjati was the correct one at that time. This opinion is really not correct and based too much on the experience of the Communist party in the Soviet Union with its Brest Litovsk agreement. The compromise policy of Linggardjati was meant to create what was called a "breathing spell" to allow the government and people of Indonesia further consolidation and development of the victories of the Revolution and to create a "launching pad" to intensify the anti-colonial war. In reality, however, this breathing spell benefitted the Dutch very much; it harmed the Revolution and the policy of a united front and conflicted with Article 33 of the Constitution of 1945, because the Political Announcement of 1 November did obviously not agree with that article. It was made into the foundation upon which the problem of the economic relations between Indonesia and Holland could be solved.

Naturally, if the Linggardjati Agreement had been signed when the Party had had experience of the problem of a united front, of ideological development, organization, and political problems, and if the Party had been influential enough among the people to use the breathing spell for extension of influence and the consolidation of its power and of the united national front, the agreement would have had completely different results.

After the Party supported the compromise policy of Linggardjati, its worst political step followed, i.e., leading the way to the Renville Agreement. When this agreement was signed, the Communists had delivered themselves from the influence of the opportunism of the right wing socialists. However, as a result of political mistakes of the Party their relations with the democratic groups were actually still strained. These groups were to a certain extent incited against the Communists by radical left wing elements.

The mistakes of the Party reached their culmination point when the Communists and other progressive elements in charge of the cabinet of Amir Sjarifuddin left the government simultaneously to let the command of the cabinet fall into the hands of Hatta, who had all the time shown his anti-Communist nature and his preference for the policy and ideology of right wing socialists. The government of Hatta and the bourgeois party that supported him did not only pursue the agreement of Linggardjati and Renville, but prepared even further compromises with the Dutch.

Extremely isolated as they were, the Communists and progressives who were united in the FDR finally had to suffer a very bitter experience which claimed many victims. They could not stop the provocation that had been prepared long ago by the reactionary forces under vice-president Moh. Hatta, who was at the same time prime minister in the cabinet of 1948-1949. During this period, the foreign agents, right-wing socialists,

a great part of the middle class and radical leftists united in an anti-Communist front.

The tragic happenings that followed one another during the revolution had to be followed by another tragedy which defeated the August Revolution for some time. This tragedy was the cursed agreement of the KMB [Konferensi Medja Bunder-Round Table Conference], which not only completely restored the power of the Dutch capitalists, but also nearly all the tools of colonial power in the shape of the United States of Indonesia, the result of the creative force of its architects, Hatta, Sultan Hamid and van Mook.

The August Revolution which resulted in the proclamation of the republic with its revolutionary constitution which as instrument of that struggle fulfilled the minimum requirements, met in this manner a tragic destiny after it had flamed for almost three years and had succeeded in repelling the cruel attacks of its enemies.

The August Revolution did not produce a Republic of Indonesia absolutely free and independent from imperialist and feudal influences, but a Republic of the United States of Indonesia, half feudal and half colonial.

What can we learn from our experiences between 1945 and 1960?

First, the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia was fostered by the August 1945 Revolution and therefore possesses a revolutionary and anti-colonialist character and the spirit of strong national unity. The counterrevolutionaries have demonstrated, nevertheless, that it can be turned into a tool to divide the revolutionary strength and to defeat the August Revolution.

Second, the basic deviations mentioned by President Sukarno in his speech on Independence Day did not start therefore with the Constitution of the U. S. of Indonesia and Republic of Indonesia, but already when Sutan Sjahrir and Hatta took political steps conflicting with the fundamental issues of the Constitution of 1945 between October and November of 1945.

Third, when the revolution began, the middle groups with their core of middle class and the upper level of the petit bourgeois class were able to unite with the Communists and the progressives, but when the revolution neared its end they entered the anti-Communist front together with right wing socialists and the rich bourgeois class which had become agents for foreign interests. The reason was the weakness of the ideology of the proletariat and its inexperience in supporting a united national front.

What happened with the Constitution of 1950?

In his lecture for the UNRA (abbreviation not known) of Djakarta regarding the 90th celebration of Lenin's birthday, Comrade Aidit, chairman of the Central Committee of the Party said: "Hatta did not succeed in destroying the PKI. It regained its legality and the star of its prestige shines high because of its resistance to the colonial Dutch, while Hatta's prestige has sunk low because he sponsored the treacherous Round Table Agreement with the Dutch. Although the PKI lost many leaders as the result of the white terror, it succeeded in a short time, i.e., during 1950 until the beginning of 1951, to reorganize itself and its Central Committee."

of the Party said: "Hatta did not succeed in destroying the PKI. It regained its legality and the star of its prestige shines high because of its resistance to the colonial Dutch, while Hatta's prestige has sunk low because he sponsored the treacherous Round Table Agreement with the Dutch. Although the PKI lost many leaders as the result of the white terror, it succeeded in a short time, i.e., during 1950 until the beginning of 1951, to reorganize itself and its Central Committee."

Not long after the PKI reorganized its Central Committee, it faced historic duties of a most difficult nature. It had to determine its attitude toward the government of Sukiman, who, in August 1951, organized anti-Communist raids and arbitrarily arrested many Communists and progressives while many many of their leaders had already been lost as a result of the Madiun provocation.

The PKI could then follow one of two policies:

- (a) Isolate the most stubborn of the ruling coalition and neutralize or if possible win the middle groups, or
- (b) Treat the ruling coalition as one compact anti-Communist force.

It was indeed a difficult task to determine the right policy of the two mentioned. A group of the higher party functionaries had a strong feeling that the whole middle class had betrayed the revolution and had tried in cooperation with the stubborn groups to destroy Communism, it had cooperated on behalf of the Round Table Conference and sponsored the Constitution of 1950 as a continuation of the Constitution of the U. S. of Indonesia, which was the result of that Round Table Conference. These comrades were for a while convinced that after the middle class had completely betrayed the revolution, it would persist in doing so, and that after it had sponsored the Constitution of 1950 it would remain a catspaw of the Round Table Conference and the Constitution of 1950, the result of that treacherous conference. Outside the party, the radical left wing groups were of the same opinion.

When we look back at it we must admit that this opinion was right and more in accordance with the strained political relations between on one side the ruling coalition, supporters of the Round Table Conference and performers of Sukiman's anti-Communist raids and on the other side the opposition of, especially, the Communists, and the other progressive groups.

But thanks to the skill and adroitness of the core of the Party leadership that had not been arrested, our comrades Aidit, Lukman and Njoto, thanks to Lenin's teachings in his book "Left wing Communism a Childhood Disease", thanks to the lessons of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, which can be learned from a couple of pamphlets, the Party chose the first possibility -- the overthrow of Sukiman's cabinet by combining everybody against the stubborn groups, firmly neutralizing the right wing of the middle class and attracting its left wing. Experience proved that this was the correct policy. It appeared that the ruling coalition in Sukiman's cabinet was not unanimous in its opinions, but that rather serious

differences came to light among the ruling stubborn and middle classes. Yes, even within the stubborn classes themselves, i. e., between the ruling stubborn class and those left outside the government, represented by right wing socialists who were pro-English and against the party of Sukiman, which was pro-American.

Not unimportant was also the part played by the Constitution of 1950 during this democratic parliamentary struggle to overthrow Sukiman's reactionary cabinet, because the actions of the cabinet were always in conflict with the democratic spirit of the articles of that Constitution.

The Party had a difficult problem in how to deal with the cabinet which was made up of several political elements, i.e. representatives of the middle class, right wing socialists and the stubborn group that were inclined to accept support of the Communists under certain conditions. The Party decided to support Wilopo to an extent that needs to be explained to the people. The idea was actually to incite the more courageous middle class to wrest power from the government without the support of the stubborn groups of the Masjumi [Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia-Indonesian Moslem Party] or the PSI [Partai Socialis Indonesia-Indonesian Socialist Party]. The attempted coup of 17 October severely tested this strategy of the PKI.

The attempt of the provisional parliament to divide the middle classes from the reactionary groups was not completely successful. The reason was that although the incident of 17 October could be overcome, the ruling groups, consisting of the middle classes and the reactionaries of the Masjumi and the PSI, remained united and maintained the cabinet until what is famous as "the incident of Moh. Rum's bulldozer of death" happened because his decisions clearly infringed upon the fundamental human rights guaranteed by the Constitution of 1950.

The periods of the cabinets of Sukiman and Wilopo enriched the Party with new experience that was very valuable and useful for the development for the Party's political strategy of attracting the middle classes, including its right wing, and isolating the stubborn reactionaries who were basically anti-Communist, but also demonstrated internal differences because their right wing leaned towards the right wing socialists whereas the others did not wish to become the beast of burden for these socialists.

When Wilopo's cabinet dissolved and Ali's was established, the political situation became favorable for the Party and the struggle of the Indonesian people.

After the Party succeeded in its Fifth Congress in solving the basic problem of the Revolution its duties became clearer and its strategy of support for a united national anti-imperialist and anti-feudal front, based on a stable agreement between workers and peasants, developed faster.

The general elections for Parliament and Constituency, held in a democratic manner on the basis of the articles of the Constitution of 1950, resulted in an honorable political position for the Party amidst the people of Indonesia. It became fourth with six million votes.

During the second cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Parliament elected in these elections won great praise with its historical decision to cancel formally the Agreement of the Round Table Conference. The decision of this Parliament elected by the people was used later by the people, with the workers as their front fighters, to take over the greatest share of the Dutch enterprises. The reason was that the stubborn Dutch did not want to surrender their de facto power over West Irian to the Republic of Indonesia.

The democratic government of the Republic of Indonesia decided on several other steps to exterminate anti-government conspiracies and counterrevolutionary insurrections of DI [Darul Islam -- Moslem Nation], TII [Tentara Islam Indonesia -- Moslem Army of Indonesia], PRRI (abbreviation unknown) and PERMESTA [People's Party of the Republic of Indonesia] with the intention to follow the basic directives of the Constitution of 1950. These were good experiences that benefitted the people, but we must also mention that the Constitution of 1950 had bad results too, that did not benefit the struggle of the country. The reason was its liberal character, which placed the President and Commander in Chief Sukarno in a position of being just the constitutional head of the country, who cannot be disturbed or held responsible. This created the situation whereby cabinets would fall and be established with great frequency whenever the majority in Parliament wished this. As far as the actual political and economic struggle was concerned, this resulted in a liberal attitude of the government during the Constitution of 1950 with damaging results. This resulted in an economic fight of those in power using all legal and illegal deceitful means.

The Parliament elected on the basis of general, direct and democratic elections served the people of Indonesia well, but this was not the case with the Constituent Assembly elected by the people. This was caused by the articles of Constitution of 1950, which make it impossible for the Constituent Assembly to arrive at a decision without the support of at least two thirds of the votes of a session of at least two thirds of its members. Another reason was the stubborn attitude of groups within the Assembly that were against the Pantja Sila. They were led by the Masjumi, and the result was that the Assembly was unable to finish its historical task as hoped by the people.

The end of the Constituent Assembly was tragic because it proved its inability to make a new Constitution to replace the one of 1950. It also failed to agree with the message of President Sukarno of 22 April 1959 which suggested: "Follow the Guided Democracy based on the Return to the Constitution of 1945".

Even more tragic was that the Constituent Assembly could not formally accept President Sukarno's suggestion to return to the Constitution of 1945 while there was a strong general feeling against the several parties. Under those conditions the spirit to dissolve the parties temporarily paralyzed the thoughts of the ruling classes. When the Constituent Assembly failed therefore, the spirit to dissolve the parties became so strong as to almost endanger the political life of our

nation, including the political groups and parties that supported President Sukarno's suggestion to return to the Constitution of 1945.

The experience of the Party with the Constitution of 1950 lead to two conclusions:

(1) The Constitution of 1950 has negative as well as positive features. It got its negative liberal feature from the political spirit of the Round Table Conference which sponsored this Constitution during the months of September and October of 1950. Its positive features include democratic articles that live up to the minimum requirements to carry out the following political actions: development of a progressive force, unification with the middle classes, and isolation of the reactionary forces;

(2) The period of the Constitution of 1950 gave the Communists and progressive forces a lot of experience of political problems and the fine techniques of support for the united front. So they learned to know several characteristics of classes not belonging to the proletariat, such as:

(a) The stubborn reactionaries representing the agents of foreign economic interests and the landowners generally found that the leadership of the Masjumi and PSI do not represent a really united force, although these people are basically all against Communism. The Sukiman faction of the Masjumi, which is very anti-Communist, cannot resist the middle classes, with their neutral attitude toward Communism. The supporters of Natsir and the right wing socialists, who were always anti-Communist because of this widely flourishing popular movement, did not only attempt to resist Communism vigorously, but also President Sukarno as the great nationalistic and democratic leader with all kinds of methods inside and outside Parliament;

(b) The middle groups with the economically very weak middle class and the upper levels of the small bourgeois class, who within certain limits are essentially in favor of the Party's united national front, which can effectively deliver them from the political grip of the reactionaries. However, in these middle groups are currents or wings whose attitude toward the Communists and progressives shows a difference in degree:

(3) The antagonistic factions of the basic struggle between the people and its enemies outside and inside the country were often irreconcilable, but the struggle to end the differences of the people themselves sometimes became very extreme, especially after the counter-revolution of the PRRI and Permesta had been subdued. The reconciliation of the differences within the population then required more experience and training, because it is actually not easy to determine definitely a shift of the right wing of the middle classes toward the strongholds or alliance of stubbornly reactionary classes;

(4) To facilitate efforts of any given moment, exact knowledge is required of real political attitude of the influential figures of the middle class, and the Party therefore has to study accurately the following:

(a) Their economic situation, status within the country, their leadership, (b) their political experience, especially with the Party, taking generally into consideration the influence of other groups, (c) connections with other groups of a strong political and economic nature, (d) their attitude toward the wealth and the finances of the country, whether they sometimes experience extensive corruption and (e) their ways and wisdom in deciding upon their attitude toward Communists and progressives day to day.

What is the meaning of the support of the PKI for the Constitution of 1945?

The great majority of the people felt relieved when they heard Sukarno's speech of 20 February 1959 in Jogjakarta, announcing the decision of Djuanda's cabinet on the "Execution of Guided Democracy on the basis of Return to the Constitution of 1945". President Sukarno was in complete agreement with this decision.

The great majority of the people felt relieved and enthusiastic because with the President's publication of the decision of the cabinet the very critical political situation of Indonesia became quiet.

Only a very few were angered and disappointed when they heard the President's speech urging us all to return to the Constitution of 1945. They were fascists and vagrants with the bad intention to abuse the dissolution of the parties as a method to develop a military or civilian coup d'etat. Who these people were became soon a public secret. Because the people definitely knew who, by way of DENAS [abbreviation unexplained in source] or what are called the "Definitions of Bogor", tried to overpower the majority in Parliament in a mechanical and cheap manner. In this manner they were preparing the way for the dissolution of the parties.

During the plenary session of the Constituent Assembly of May 1959, we heard the explanation of Sudijono Djojoprajitno as spokesman of the proletarian delegation. He said that if there really are people who keep mentioning the problem of the dissolution of the parties, the proletarian delegation will join a group that will actively support dissolution. However, these claims to dissolve the parties are mere strategy to "urge the President and the cabinet of Djuanda to return to the Constitution of 1945", according to Sudijono.

We don't want to get ourselves mixed up with the internal arrangements of another party, but the actions of people of whatever class or party to pursue the dissolution of the parties as strategy, or for reasons of principle, are completely wrong.

The problem of the dissolution of the parties is a very fundamental problem that cannot be separated from the problem of a class society. The PKI thinks that as long as there are classes in society, and they can naturally always be found in a capitalist society, we may not prevent the development of parties as expression of the several class interests.

Dissolving the parties in a class society, as at present in Indonesia basically means suppression of the democratic rights and liberties of the people in order to maintain the rights and the liberties

of a small ruling class. So much the more so if this dissolution is being promoted by those called by Sukarno the "party of chickenfleas". The results will inevitably be terrorist anarchy or fascist dictatorship of these "chickenfleas", who seriously endanger the peace and the prosperity of the Republic of Indonesia.

RAISE HIGH THE BANNERS OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT

IN THE FIELD OF IDEOLOGY

[Following is the translation of an article by B. O. Hutapea in Bintang Meran (The Red Star), Vol XVI, Djakarta, May-June 1960, pages 220-231]

It has been 40 years since the PKI [Communist Party of Indonesia] was born, always giving its true and unselfish devotion to the Indonesian people. The PKI has now gathered in its ranks more than 1½ million young men and women from among almost all Indonesian clans, who are consistently opposed to imperialism and feudalism. The PKI has high prestige because the PKI program is wholly commensurate with the vital interest of the Indonesian people and nation, and because its policy cannot be separated from the economic and political interest of the masses and of the national interest. The organization of the PKI has expanded through our whole fatherland. With pride, we Indonesian Communists are now celebrating our 40th anniversary and the situation is such that we are leaping forward in all fields.

The rapid advance of the PKI did not take place until the year 1951. The year 1951, therefore, has a special meaning and significance in the history of the development of the PKI. The preceding period was one in which it was very difficult for the Party to grow, and a period in which the Party repeatedly made serious mistakes, both in the field of policy and in the field of organization. On the other hand, the period which succeeded was a new period in which the Party grew and bore fruit and a period in which, up to now, it has not made grave mistakes in the field of policy and organization. Until the year 1951 our Party scored but few victories; it declined a lot and showed many weaknesses. Nevertheless, the Party stood upright and kept on holding its glorious tradition in the revolutionary struggle against the imperialists and the landlords. By 1951, the Party began to be able to gather and to digest the bitter experiences from the preceding periods, and it has begun to take valuable lessons from them. From that time on, our Party has found ways and methods to implement Marxism, commensurate with Indonesian situations. From that time on, step by step, it began to reach the position which has been predetermined by history, that is, as the Party of the Indonesian proletarians that leads the struggle of the Indonesian people in attaining national independence and in developing Socialism in Indonesia. At present

the PKI has become a big force which is undefeatable, and it has become one of the determining factors in the political life and further development of Indonesia.

Before 1951, the PKI received no less than four heavy blows, viz. the unsuccessful rebellion in 1926, the mass arrest and exile of the PKI leaders to Digul in 1938, the mass arrest and massacre of the Communists by the Japanese fascists during their occupation from 1942-1945, and the second White Terror of Madiun provocation in 1948, which was done by Hatta. In addition, when the August 1945 Revolution broke out, the PKI did not play its proper role.

The blows and the failings brought severe shocks and serious crises in the body of the Party. The mistakes which during that time existed in the leadership of the Party have repeatedly put the Party in a position in which it was isolated from the masses, and sometimes it even made the Party become a mere sect. The Party organization was often disjointed, and sometimes it was temporarily paralyzed. Beside that, the mistakes were at the sacrifice of thousands of faithful Party cadres. These mistakes have a great influence on the course of our national revolution, and because of them the course of the Indonesian revolution has been more complicated than it should be. All these experiences have proven that the blows received by the PKI, those that come from outside the Party as well as those caused by the internal weakness of the Party, have a direct influence on the endeavour for national independence; they were direct blows to the Indonesian revolution.

The fact that after 1951 the position of the Party was changed does not at all mean that since that year the reactionary group has ceased its attack on the PKI, on the other democratic powers, and on the revolution. The line of thought that gave birth to Sukiman's August raid in 1951 has the same root as the "red drive proposals" that gave birth to Hatta's White Terror in 1948. The sabotage, terror, burning, and other illegal activities of the DI [Moslem Movement] and TII [Islam Army of Indonesia] were directed to liquidating the PKI and the Republik. The 17 October affair in 1952 was an attempt at a coup d'etat, viz. to take the government by force and bring back to our country the power of the imperialists activities which culminated in the armed rebellion of Achmad Husein, Sjafrudin, Simbolon, Sumual, Kawilarang, and Marouw, did not hide their ill-disposed purpose of liquidating the PKI and turn the course of the revolution, viz., to make of Indonesia a country which is independent only in name, but which in actuality are only patches of imperialistic countries. It is clear then that the reactionaries are unceasingly trying to liquidate the PKI and to turn the course of the revolution.

However, thanks to the strength of the anti-imperialist united national front, which has been made possible by the increased strength of the Party, all attempts of the reactionaries have failed. The failure of the August raid was a turning point in our country's political situation. When the raid was still raging, that is, the time when about 2000 cadres and Party activists were jailed by Sukiman, the Party's central

command began to take the initiative from the reactionaries' hands. The PKI came forward with a broad united national front policy, which united all anti-imperialist forces, propagating unity to beat the DI and TII, and to replace Sukiman's cabinet, and to base ourselves on the union between the workers and the Indonesian farmers. This policy, which fitted the situation, succeeded. The middle-of-the-roaders who at first followed Sukiman, or at least did not prevent Sukiman's raid, broke their cooperation with reactionaries and united with the progressive forces in order to obstruct the reactionary policy. The Sukiman cabinet was forced to give up. For the first time since the unsuccessful revolution in 1948, the Party was invited to discuss the formation of a new cabinet, and for the first time the middle-of-the-roaders were given a chance to lead the cabinet. Since then, except for a short intermezzo during the reign of Burhanuddin Harahap's reactionary government in 1955, slowly but surely the political situation shifted to the left.

What actually happened in the body of the Party around the year 1951, which brought a fundamental change in the Party as well as in the course of the Indonesian revolution?

In his book "The birth of the PKI and its evolution", Comrade D. N. Aidit discussed each of the periods that have been passed by the PKI. In summarizing the experiences of the Party during the period 1920-1926, he pointed out that the PKI is inexperienced with regard to two basic problems, viz. (1) the problem of a united front, and (2) the problem of Party development. This conclusion hit the mark, and these two basic weaknesses were not overcome in the period after 1926 and in general they still existed in the body of the party until 1951.

The former Party policy was not a united front policy, and the development of the Party was not patterned according to the Lenin type of Party principles. Assuming that the Party organization was good at that time, with a wrong policy, the Party would be separated from the masses and lose its role as a forerunner of the People's movement, so that the formerly good organization would little by little go to pieces and become powerless. The same thing would happen to the devotion of the members of the Party. Ever since the birth of the PKI, the spirit of the PKI members could be described by one sentence, viz. it is high and flaming. Their devotion is unconditional and they sacrificed themselves bravely. Beside that, their willingness to work is extraordinary. However, owing to the Party's mistakes in the field of policy, viz. that of not following a united front policy; mistakes in the field of organization, viz., not developing a Party organization according to the Lenin-type of Party principles, those praiseworthy characteristics did not help in defeating the Party's enemy.

The basic mistake of the PKI during the revolution of 1945-1948, has its roots in the subjectivism that gave birth to faulty policy and organization. At that time, the Party leadership did not at all think about building up a revolutionary power in the form of a united national front. On the other hand, there existed in the Party leadership a view that belittles the strength of the masses and exaggerates the reactionary power,

and this is a reversal of reality. With such a faulty attitude, it is not possible for the Party to build a program that can inspire and lead anti-Dutch forces which will include all levels of the people. The subjectivism isolated the Party all the more because it implemented a policy that did not channel the Party activities into leading the revolutionary mass actions, but was too much directed toward parliamentary struggle. Because the Party did not take the position of a forerunner of the revolution, in the field of organization, the independence of the Party was lost. The Party became a mere follower of the Partai Socialis [Socialist Party], which has a non-proletarian ideology. Even though it called itself a Marxist-Leninist Party, the PKI became powerless, and it made mistakes that degraded it all the more.

In contrast, after 1951, the policy implemented by the PKI was a united national front policy, and it was executed in a consistent way, often by "suppressing its feelings" or by "restricting itself" with regard to questions that are not fundamental. The united national front policy has to be implemented in a consistent, yet flexible and elastic manner. Symptoms of obstruction against this official policy inside the party have to be controlled with all the power the Party has. The Party organization has to be adapted in order to execute this policy as well as possible and to guarantee its independence as well as possible. With a more suitable organization and the right way of doing things, the implementation of a united national front will also be better. And thus it goes on, the progress in the united national front and the progress in the Party development will influence and push each other. Indeed, as is stated by Comrade D. N. Aidit, policy is as important as a general in a war. With the right policy and the right implementation, the situation can always be controlled and be pushed forward.

Why was our Party before 1951 not able to construct a united front policy and why was it able to do that after 1951? The answer is that before there was no united proletarian ideology in the PKI, while later there was one.

In the Preamble of the Constitution of the PKI, it is pointed out that, due to several objective factors, the development of the Indonesian revolution is not always the same, and this resulted in that the revolution takes a long time and becomes complicated. It is further emphasized that "a long struggle may bring with it the danger that individuals who are weak and who have no character will follow a policy of surrendering, or they may follow an adventurous and inconsistent policy. The experience of the PKI, specifically its experience until 1951, is living proof of this conclusion. In its youth, the PKI fell prey to the subjectivism of the "leftist" petit-bourgeoisie. At that time, the Party leaders tried to solve all the problems at once, for example, the problem of freeing ourselves from Dutch colonialism, and that of liquidating feudalism and capitalism. The Party put forward slogans that were too "leftist", like "We have to have Socialism right now", "Indonesian Soviet", etc. This is proof of the adventurous and risky policy that was followed by the PKI, which happened because it did not have the patience necessary in a revolution and because it did not realize that a struggle always takes time.

The Fourth Congress of the Party in Solo in 1947 ratified the cease-fire agreement with Dutch imperialism and also ratified the Linggadjati agreement. This is clear proof of the disease that existed in the Party in the form of a willingness to surrender, because it did not have perseverance and endurance. What lies at the root of all this is the weakness in theory and ideology.

The history of the Marxist movement has everywhere shown a struggle between true Marxist ideology and a false and characterless Marxist ideology. The Marxist movement in Indonesia has also shown the same internal struggle.

The symptoms of the existence of false and characterless Marxists is very clear. When The Party was founded in 1920, Darsono was a member of the Central Committee of the PKI. Now he is a traitor to Marxism. This proves that during the time he was in the PKI, he was not a true Marxist, but a false one. After the failure of the 1926 rebellion, the Dutch colonial government launched a cruel attack on the People and the PKI. At the same time, the reactionaries also launched an ideological attack on the Party. Those elements in the Party that do not have a strong ideology were scared and soon withdrew. At the critical moment, voices were heard about Noh. Hatta's effort to eliminate entirely any Communistic influence from Indonesia's national independence movement. Hatta, who at that time was president of the Perhimpunan Indonesia [Indonesian Society] in Holland, sneakily tried to persuade the PKI leaders that were abroad to give over the command over the People's movement back in Indonesia to the PI [Perhimpunan Indonesia]. This impudence could only happen because of the weakness of the Party in the field of ideology. It was lucky that the mistake was soon corrected. At the same time, the PKI was betrayed by Tan Malaka, who was a leader and a founder of the PKI. After it was decided by the Party to prepare an armed rebellion, he was still wavering, and he never stood clearly on the side of the People, who were rebelling. When the rebellion failed, instead of defending the PKI, he blamed it. Afterward, he founded a new party, the PARI [Partai Republik Indonesia] which was directed to liquidate the PKI. This is very clear proof that in the PKI there were characterless false Marxists.

All these events showed that, ever since its birth, the PKI has had to deal with false Marxists and that this false Marxist ideology was at one time in command of the Party. Taking a lesson from the struggle of the true Marxists against false Marxist ideology, which was summarized in the experiences of the PKI itself and in the experiences of other friendly parties, the Preamble of the Constitution strongly warns us that: "In order to be strong and stable, the PKI has to fight mercilessly against the dangerous elements." The false Marxist bring with them in the Party the disease of opportunism, that is, the disease of surrendering and of having adventures with other parties. Fighting against "kapitulasiisme" [the policy of surrendering] means fighting against rightist opportunism, fighting against "avonturisme" [an adventurous and inconsistent policy], means fighting against leftist opportunism. This means that in the Party there has to be a simultaneous attack against these two kinds of opportunism.

A slackening is sure to hurt the Party as well as the revolution. The struggle against these two kinds of opportunism is in effect an ideological struggle, viz., the struggle of the proletarian ideology against the bourgeois ideology, the petit-bourgeois ideology, and other anti-proletarian ideology; it is also the struggle of the true Marxists against the false Marxists in the Party. The struggle will keep on as long as there is a class struggle in society itself, because the ideological struggle in the Party is a reflection of the class struggle in the society, and hence it will keep on as long as the Party exists.

The ideological struggle is very important for the development of the PKI. The result of the ideological struggle will determine the fate of the Indonesian revolution. The history of the true Marxists in the Party at the end of 1950 closed a dark era and opened an enlightened period for the struggle of the Indonesian People. However, since the class struggle in the Indonesian society does not stop, but has on the contrary become keener, so the ideological struggle in the PKI does not stop either. The true Marxists in the PKI should not be self-complacent because of the great victory in 1950. On the contrary, they should be more wary than ever. For that reason, the Central Committee of the PKI, which has become Leninist since the above mentioned year, has unceasingly trained and developed all the Party rank and file to give life to and to develop the internal Party struggle in the field of ideology. The struggle is directed towards the victory of proletarian ideology in the Party, to see to it that the true Marxists do not lose position but that they win over the false Marxists, and furthermore, to see to it that the position of the true Marxists in the Party leadership is strong.

At present, the PKI is 40 years old, which is an old enough age. However, since its very birth up to 1950, the wing of the true Marxists has never had as strong and stable a position in the PKI as it has now. This means that, in that 40 years, during not less than 30 years the Party has had to struggle to free itself from the non-Marxist ideology in the Party, besides having to lead the struggle of the People against the imperialists. The above mentioned period reminds us of the blows that were received by the Party and by the revolution, and of the sufferings and bitterness. Nevertheless, if we can take as many lessons as possible from it, that period will not always be a dark period in the history of our Party. The digging and digesting of the many experiences during those 30 years will help us to clarify the mistakes that were made in the ideological struggle. It will help us to recognize the false Marxists and their bad practices. We also get a lesson in how to control the internal Party struggle, in order to force the false Marxist to come out of hiding, to expose them, and to shatter them.

All members and candidate members of the Party, especially those who are new, should understand clearly the ideological source of the false Marxists that we have in the PKI. Our country is a petit-bourgeois country. Our Party is therefore always surrounded by the petit-bourgeois, with all their habits. Most of the members of the PKI come from among them, and in doing their political duties, the members have to be active among them. All these result in that, to some extent, their way of thinking,

their habits, their outlook on life, in short, the petit-bourgeois ideology, will be brought into our Party. Thus it is clear that this petit-bourgeoisie is the social basis of the disease of opportunism in the PKI. It also becomes clear to us that, as long as there is no radical change in the economic structure, as long as there are very many owners of little enterprises, especially farm owners, the threat of the petit-bourgeois ideology, inside as well as outside the Party, will always be latent. For this reason, we must always be alert, because at all times the illegitimate ideology may water down the pure proletarian ideology in the Party.

What other conclusions can be drawn from the experiences of our Party in strengthening the position of the true Marxist in the Party? By studying the victories and the mistakes that were made in the internal Party struggle, we find some faulty line of thought that needs correction. For example, there is a line of thought that oversimplified the problem by saying that, by increasing the number of proletarian elements in the Party, the position of the true Marxists will automatically become stronger.

It is true indeed that those Party members that have the working class as background, even though they have not been members for long and still lack theoretical knowledge, already have a strong working class attitude. Their strong class attitude was born and tested in their daily life as workers. In this respect, some exaggeration is still being done. The fact is that in our country modern industries are still lacking. The number of plants is small, and because Indonesia is an agricultural country, there are no strong industrial centers as in industrial countries. Beside that, through all kinds of channels, the workers have strong relations with the farmers. Thus, the number of modern industry workers is still very limited in our country. Of course, it would be entirely wrong if we wait until there are enough modern workers in our country, in order to get them in the Party, and to fight and win over the petit-bourgeoisie ideology in the Party. Furthermore, if the Communists talk about strengthening the proletarian elements in the Party, they always mean to get in the Party the most advanced workers, those that have been tested in defending the interest of their class against their employers, those that are most experienced in the organization of labor unions, and those that have some minimal cultural level. Those that become members of the Party are thus the selected ones. It is, therefore, a big mistake if we accept in the Party all the workers without further ado and forget the above mentioned conditions for the sole purpose of "strengthening the position of the proletarian element in the Party". A campaign to broaden the Party membership among the workers is now and then necessary, so as to attract the most advanced workers in order to improve the class composition of the membership.

It is clear then, that in order that true Marxism may win in the Party, the social background of the Party membership is not the only factor. "The determining factors", said Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i, "are the political struggles and the political life of our Party, as well as its ideological training and its political leadership." Thus those Party members that come from the petit-bourgeoisie, and those that come from

the student group, all may, through political and ideological training, become true Marxists. The history of the development of the PKI, has wholly substantiated this. The greater part of the true Marxists in the Party has always come from other than the working class. This is a lesson which may correct faulty thinking.

However, the most valuable lesson is the discovery of the best way in which to combat the non-proletarian ideology in the Party. In his Report to the Sixth National Congress of the Party, Comrade D. N. Aidit once again summarized those ways, in which "it is very important that we do two things: First, train the Party members to use the Marxist-Leninist method in analyzing a political situation and gauging the strength of a class. In this way we will avoid subjective analyses and calculations. Secondly, to lead the interest of the members towards research and study in social and economic fields in order to determine the fighting tactics and work methods, and thus make our comrades understand that errors in analyzing a situation will make them sink in [a world of] fantasy and adventurism."

This is a very good and useful summary, and it could reach such perfection only because Comrade D. N. Aidit has been able to summarize his experiences and the experiences of all true Marxists in the PKI by means of Marxist-Leninist tools.

Subjectivism always has two sides, viz., dogmatism and empiricism. The Dogmatists use a method that is opposed to the method of Marxist dialectics. In their eyes, a phenomenon is not viewed as something that lives and changes, but as something that stays the same and never changes. Dogmatism kills a theory and makes it useless because it doesn't relate the theory to practice.

Empiricism, on the other hand, doesn't recognize the role of a theory, but views a thing from its own narrow experience. Empiricism doesn't match practice with theory, but divorces practice from theory and regards practice as a general truth. The empiricists use a method that is also opposed to Marxist dialectics.

It is clear, then, how we should fight the subjectivist ideology, which, as is said, has two sides. First, the subjective view of the dogmatists has to be replaced by the objective view of Dialectic and Historical Materialism. Secondly, the mistakes of dogmatism and empiricism, which both divorce theory from practice, have to be contended with relating theory and practice. Only that way can we understand the nature of the things that we face. In short, only if we fight subjectivism by means of raising the level of our theory, by mastering the philosophy of Dialectic-Historic-Materialism, by training ourselves unceasingly in the Marxist-Leninist spirit, can we raise the beliefs and attitudes of our class, as well as the methods used by our class.

By using simple words, Comrade D. N. Aidit has popularized the fight against subjectivism. "Knowing Marxism-Leninism and knowing the situation --this is the slogan for our study and for our work."

This principle of studying and working should be implemented through ideological training in Party schools so that it will become a conviction

in the blood and the flesh of the students. By means of that slogan, the manifestation of an ideology hostile to the proletarian ideology will be disclosed. Also, the roots of the dogmatism and of the empiricism will be discovered by the students themselves. By means of that slogan, they will be trained to analyze, to correct and to improve their political activities, their organizational life, and their way of thinking. By means of that slogan, they will understand more fully the political strategy, the organizational policy, the statements and the work-methods of the Party.

Through the slogan "Knowing Marxism-Leninism and knowing the situation", in 1951 the Politburo began to understand the Indonesian revolution, and by understanding the revolution it was able to determine the best policy to push forward the situation. By making the implementation of the slogan more perfect, the more the Indonesian political situation shifted to the left, the more the obstinate power was isolated, while the situation for the revolutionary movement and for the PKI itself became better and better.

We can take another lesson from the experiences in implementing the slogan. It is not only a slogan in studying and in working, but at the same time it is also a slogan for the development of the Party ideology. There is a very strong relation among studying Dialectic Historical Materialism, developing an anti-subjectivistic ideology, executing a united front policy, and developing the Party. The four of them form a unity; to study the philosophy which forms the basis of the Party; struggle for the Party policy which is the united front policy; to organize, all activities have to be coordinated according to stipulations of the Party organization, in which especially the principles of centralism and Party discipline have to be adhered to; and to unite ourselves in the Party ideology which is Marxism-Leninism. Thus: to study, to struggle, to organize, and to unite.

This is the best attitude that we can have in welcoming the 40th anniversary of our beloved PKI.

Raise high the banners of Party development in the field of ideology!